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Abstract 
This study employs various bootstrapped Malmquist indices and efficiency scores to 
investigate the effects of government regulation on the performance of the Iranian banking 
industry over the period 2003-2008. An alternative decomposition of the Malmquist index, 
introduced by Simar and Wilson (1998a), is also applied to decompose technical changes 
further into pure technical change and changes in scale efficiency.  A combination of these 
approaches facilitates a robust and comprehensive analysis of Iranian banking industry 
performance. While this approach is more appropriate than the traditional Malmquist 
approach, for the case of banking efficiency studies, it has not previously been conducted for 
any developing country’s banking system. The results obtained show that although, in 
general, the regulatory changes had different effects on individual banks, the efficiency and 
productivity of the overall industry declined after regulation. We also find that productivity 
had positive growth before regulation mainly due to improvements in pure technology, and 
that government ownership had an adverse impact on the efficiency level of state-owned 
banks. The bootstrap approach demonstrates that the majority of estimates obtained in this 
study are statistically significant. 
 
Keywords: Regulation; Productivity; Banking; Data envelopment analysis; Bootstrap; 
Malmquist indices  
JEL codes: C02, C14, C61; G21 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade the Iranian banking industry has undergone many substantial changes, 
such as liberalization, government regulation and technological advances, which have 
resulted in extensive restructuring of the industry. These changes in policy have affected both 
government-owned banks (including commercial banks and specialized banks) and private 
banks. The former have been the most successful in acquiring market share, and it is mainly 
due to this reason that private banks are much newer than theses banks; they joined the 
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market after 2001. However, it seems that government-owned banks were affected more 
noticeably after government regulation initiatives launched in 2005, which obliged all banks 
to reduce deposit and loan interest rates considerably. The government also imposed different 
interest rates and conditions on public and private banks, and imposed obligations on 
government-owned banks to assign higher priority in their lending operations to areas such as 
advanced technology projects, small and medium enterprises, and housing projects for low 
income earners. As a result, the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) of government-owned 
banks increased dramatically after 2006. According to the Central Bank of Iran, CBI, (2006), 
the annual growth rate of government-owned banks’ NPLs was less than 30% before 2005, 
however this figure increased markedly to 129% in 2006. CBI (2006) also state that the 
highest share of the NPLs belongs to the "manufacturing and mining" (20.1%) and 
"construction" (19.5%) sectors. For these reasons in particular, this study investigates the 
effect of government policies on the productivity of the Iranian banking industry.  
Fethi and Pasiouras (2010), in a comprehensive survey covering 196 studies which 
had applied operational research and artificial intelligence techniques in the assessment of 
bank performance, reveal that almost all studies that obtained estimates of total factor 
productivity growth employed a DEA1-type Malmquist index. This result demonstrates that 
the Malmquist index has widespread use in examining total factor productivity growth. 
Initially, Caves, Christensen and Diewert, (1982) introduced the Malmquist productivity 
index as a theoretical index. Färe et al. (1992) later merged Farrell’s (1957) measurement of 
efficiency with Caves et al.’s (1982) measurement of productivity to develop a new 
Malmquist index of productivity change. Färe et al. (1992) subsequently demonstrate that the 
resulting total factor productivity (TFP) indices could be decomposed into efficiency change 
and technical change components. Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994b) further 
decompose the efficiency change into pure technical efficiency change and changes in scale 
efficiency, a development which results in the Malmquist index becoming widely popular as 
an empirical index of productivity change.  
However, Simar and Wilson (1998a) state that the FGNZ model does not provide a 
useful measure of technical change and their empirical results show that all the estimated 
means for technical change are insignificant: “many of the inaccuracies in FGNZ … may be 
attributed to their confusion between unknown quantities and estimates of these quantities” 
                                                            
1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is one of the most popular non-parametric approaches in the literature that 
has been used widely in frontier efficiency and productivity methods. 
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(p. 4). Moreover, they conclude that “Without a statistical interpretation, it is not meaningful 
to draw inferences from results obtained with these methods as it is otherwise impossible to 
know whether the numbers reflect real economic phenomena or merely sampling variation” 
(p. 18).  Instead, they propose an alternative decomposition of the Malmquist index. They 
estimate changes in technology by changes in the variable returns to scale (VRS) estimate, 
and further decompose the technical changes into pure technical change and changes in the 
scale of efficiency.  
The DEA approach for estimating distance functions when constructing Malmquist 
indices is problematic. As DEA is a non-parametric approach, it does not allow for random 
errors and does not have any statistical foundation, hence making it inadequate for testing 
statistical significance of the estimated distance functions, or for conducting sensitivity 
analyses to examine their asymptotic properties; see Lovell (2000), Coelli et al. (2005), and 
Simar and Wilson (1998b, 1999, 2000). The inherent problem with mainstream DEA analysis 
is that distances to the frontier are underestimated if the most efficient firms within the 
population are not included in the sample. Analysis in this situation leads to biased frontier 
estimation from the sample and results in distances to all other units being measured relative 
to this biased frontier. Undoubtedly, uncertainty is carried through to parameters such as the 
Malmquist indices of TFP changes which are estimated from DEA distance functions. 
To solve this problem, Simar and Wilson (1998b, 2000) define a statistical model, the 
bootstrap simulation method, which allows for determining the statistical properties of the 
non-parametric estimators in the multi-input and multi-output case, and hence for 
constructing confidence intervals for DEA efficiency scores. In their later study, Simar and 
Wilson (1999) demonstrate that the bootstrap technique can also be employed to estimate 
confidence intervals for Malmquist indices. The most important practical implication of their 
conclusion is that statistical inference becomes possible for Malmquist indices. In this study, 
we employ the Simar and Wilson (1998a) approach to measure the Malmquist index and its 
components - changes in pure technical efficiency, changes in scale efficiency, pure changes 
in technology and changes in scale of technology - to provide a more inclusive and robust 
analysis of productivity and technical change in the banking industry of Iran. For the first 
time in the context of a developing country, we also employ the bootstrap simulation method 
(Simar & Wilson, 1998b; 2000) to determine whether the computed changes in productivity 
are real or not. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a literature 
review of the bootstrapped Malmquist indices. Sections 3 and 4 describe the methodology of 
Malmquist indices and the bootstrap technique, respectively. Section 5 explains the data and 
Section 6 discusses the results followed by some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review of Bootstrapped Malmquist Studies 
Despite a large body of literature surrounding the traditional (FGNZ) Malmquist index, there 
is little written about the usage of the bootstrapped Malmquist. Only a small number of 
studies have applied the statistical properties of the Malmquist estimates; see Hoff (2006), 
Galdeano-Gómez (2008), Balcombe et al. (2008), and Latruffe et al. (2008)2. The exception 
is Tortosa-Ausina et al. (2008) who use both the FGNZ model and the bootstrap technique to 
investigate the productivity of the Spanish banking system over the post-deregulation period 
1992–1998. Their findings show that productivity growth occurred, and that this was mainly 
attributable to an improvement in production possibilities (technical changes). Their 
bootstrap analysis also revealed that productivity changes for most of the firms were not 
statistically significant. 
Our study is, therefore, unique in the sense that the bootstrap technique has not previously 
been applied to the alternative decomposition of Malmquist indices in the evaluation of a 
developing country’s banking system. Wheelock and Wilson (1999) and Gilbert and Wilson 
(1998) analyse the banking systems of developed countries, the US and Korean systems 
respectively. Wheelock and Wilson (1999), using the alternative decomposition of the 
Malmquist productivity index, show that the growing inefficiency of US banks in the period 
1984-1993 can be largely attributed to the general failure of banks to adopt technological 
improvements. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) study the effect of deregulation on the productivity 
of Korean banks between 1980 and 1994. The index of changes in pure technology indicates 
that after deregulation Korean banks altered their mix of inputs and outputs considerably, 
leading to improvements in productivity. The index of change in the scale of technology 
suggested that the most efficient scale size was increasing over time. While it seems that in 
many empirical applications the bootstrap approach is more appropriate than the traditional 
                                                            
2 Hoff (2006) applied bootstrapped Malmquist to the fisheries sector for assessing TFP changes for the fleet of 
Danish seiners operating in the North Sea and the Skagerrak. Galdeano-Gómez (2008) applied this technique in 
the field of marketing cooperatives. Balcombe et al. (2008) and Latruffe et al. (2008) estimated bootstrapped 
Malmquist indices for samples of Polish farms. 
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Malmquist, it has not been widely used in other applied studies, presumably due to the lack of 
user-friendly software. In this study we apply the FEAR package in R, which was introduced 
by Wilson (2006) to estimate technical efficiency, the different components of the Malmquist 
productivity index, and their confidence intervals. 
  
3. Productivity Measurement Using the Malmquist Index 
To measure productivity change between periods  and , consider N firms which produce 
q outputs using p inputs over T-time periods. A generic firm in period  employs input
1t 2t
1t 1t
x to 
produce output , whereas in period  quantities are
1t
y
2t 2t
x and , respectively. The 
production possibilities set at time t is: 
1t
y
 
( ){  ,  |        tS x y x can produce y at time t= } ,        (1) 
where x is an input vector, , and y is an output vector,nx +∈
my +∈ , at time t. This can be 
described in terms of its sections. For example: 
{
2 1
( ) ( , )mt it ty x y x y S+= ∈ ∈ }         (2) 
that is its corresponding output feasibility set. Based on Shephard (1970), the output distance 
function for firm i at time  is: 1t
{ }1 21 2  inf 0  / ( )o it t itit tD yθ θ≡ > ∈ 1y x .        (3) 
The distance function
1 2
o
it tD measures the distance from the i-th firm's position in the input-
output space at time  to the boundary of the production set at time , where inputs remain 
constant and θ is a scalar equal to the efficiency score. When and are equal, then it will 
be a measure of efficiency relative to technology at the same time, and 
1t 2t
2t1t
1oit tD ≤ . When and 
are not equal, 
1t
2t 1 2
o
it tD can be <,>, or =1. 
Based on Färe et al. (1992) the Malmquist index between periods and can be defined as: 1t 2t
1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1
1 2( , )
oc oc
it t it to
i oc oc
it t it t
D D
M t t
D D
⎛ ⎞ ⎛
⎜ ⎟ ⎜=
⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠         (4)
 
which is a geometric mean of two Malmquist productivity indices for and as defined by 
Caves et al. (1982). If
1t 2t
1M > , then there has been positive total factor productivity change 
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between periods and . If 1t 2t 1M < , then there have been negative changes in the total factor 
productivity. 1M =  indicates no change in the productivity. 
 
However, Simar and Wilson (1999) argue that the production possibility set  is 
never observed and consequently, all distances defined are unobserved. Hence the Malmquist 
productivity index and the distance functions mentioned above must be estimated. This, in 
sequence, requires estimation of the production set,
tS
tS , and the output feasibility set, (y x) . 
Burgess and Wilson (1995) describe that the estimated production set can be written as:  
{ }( , ) 1,  m n Nt t tS x y y x γ γ+= ∈ ≤ = ∈,Y  ,  1Xγ γ+ ≥ +       (5) 
Where [ ]1 2, ,...,t t t NY y y y= t ityand denotes ( 1m )× vector of observed outputs, and 
[ 1 2 ,...,t ] itx,t t NtX x x= x and denotes ( 1)n× vector of observed inputs. 1 and γ  are vector of 
ones and intensity variables, respectively. Hence, the corresponding output feasibility sets can 
be described as: 
{ }( ) ,  ,  γ γ γ ∈c m Nty x y Y X += ∈ ≥t ty ≤ x+ , and       (6) 
{ }( ) ,  ,x ≥  1 1γ = ,  v m Nty x y Y Xγ γ γ+ += ∈ ∈t ty ≤ .      (7) 
Substituting ( )xcty and (
vy )xt for in equation (2) leads to estimators of the distance 
functions which can be computed by solving the following linear programs: 
( )ty x
{ }1 2t iγ 1,  ,it tY x γ21 2 1( ) max  oc Ni iit t X γ− itD yλ λ += ≤ ≥ ∈        (8) 
{ }1 2t iγ 1,  ,it t iY x γ21 2 1( ) max  1 1,  ov Nit iit t X γ γ−D yλ λ += ≤ ≥ = ∈       (9) 
where 
1 2
oc
it tD  features the assumption of constant returns to scale and 1 2
ov
it tD allows for variable 
returns to scale. Given estimates of the distance functions, estimates of the Malmquist index 
can be constructed by substituting the estimators for the corresponding true distance function 
values in (4): 
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1 2 2 2
1 1 2 1
1 2( , )
oc oc
o it t it t
i
oc oc
it t it t
D D
M t t
D D
⎛ ⎞ ⎛
⎜ ⎟ ⎜=
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⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠                   (10)
 
Alternatively, following Färe et al. (1992), this total factor productivity change can be 
decomposed into two components: 
2 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 1
1 2( , )
oc oc oc
it t it t it to
i oc oc oc
it t it t it t
Eff Tech
D D D
M t t
D D D
⎛ ⎞ ⎛
⎜ ⎟ ⎜= ×
⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
                  (11) 
Where the term outside the square root sign, Eff , is an index of relative technical efficiency 
change, and shows how much closer (or farther away) a firm gets to the best practice frontier. 
It can be greater than, less than or equal to unity depending on whether the evaluated firm 
improves, stagnates, or declines. The second component, , is the technical change 
component which measures how much the frontier shifts, and points out whether the best 
practice firm, relative to which the evaluated firm is compared, is improving, stagnating, or 
deteriorating. It can be greater than, less than or equal to unity depending on whether the 
technical change is positive, zero, or negative. 
Tech
Färe et al. (1994a) demonstrate that the technical change component can be 
decomposed into two factors: pure technical efficiency change and changes in scale 
efficiency; 
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
1 2
/
( , )
/
ov oc ov oc oc
it t it t it t it t it to
i ov oc ov oc oc
it t it t it t it t it t
PureEff Scale Tech
D D D D D
M t t
D D D D D
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜= × ×
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠
              (12)
 
where and are measures of pure efficiency change and change in scale 
efficiency, respectively, and .  remains unchanged from (11), 
and gives a measure of change in technology. While signifies that the Constant Returns 
to Scale (CRS) frontier shifts over time, pure efficiency change and scale efficiency change 
correspond to VRS frontiers from two different periods. 
PureEff Scale
Eff PureEff Scale= × Tech
Tech
On the other hand, Simar and Wilson (1998a) state that if a generic firm's position in 
the input-output space remains fixed between time  and , and the only change that 1t 2t
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happens is in the VRS estimate of technology (e.g. shift upward), then the presented in 
(12) would be equal to unity, indicating no change in technology. The only way that the
in equation (12) would show a change in technology is if the CRS estimate of the 
technology changes. Hence, it is concluded by the authors that in such a circumstance, the 
CRS estimate of the technology is statistically inconsistent. Since the VRS estimator is 
always consistent under the assumptions of Kneip et al. (1996), they propose an alternative 
decomposition of the Malmquist index to estimate changes in technology ( ) by changes 
in the VRS estimate; 
Tech
Tech
Tech
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2 1 2
2 1
1 2
/
)
/
/
ov oc ov
it t it t it t
ov oc ov
it t it t it t
PureEff Scale
ov oc ov
it t it t it t
ov
it t i
ureTech
D D D
t
D D D
D D D D
D D D
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= × ×
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟× ×
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
1 2
2 2
( ,oi
ov
it t
ov
it t
P
M t
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1
/
/ /
oc ov
it t it t
oc ov oc ov
t t it t it t it t
ScaleTech
D D
D D D
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟×
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
               (13)
 
where is further decomposed into pure technical changes, Tech PureT
  ech
ech
ScaleTech
, and changes in 
the scale of technology, , andScaleTech   Tech PureT= × . PureTech
2t
measures pure changes in technology and is the geometric mean of two ratios which measure 
the shift in the VRS frontier estimate relative to the bank's position at time  and . When1t
PureT
2t
ech is greater than unity, it indicates an expansion in pure technology. Specifically, it 
shows an upward shift of the VRS estimate of the technology. provides 
information regarding the shape of the technology by describing the change in returns to scale 
of the VRS technology estimate at two fixed points, which are the firm’s locations at times  
and . When  is greater than unity, this indicates that the technology is moving 
farther from constant returns to scale and the technology is becoming more and more convex. 
When this index is less than unity it gives us an idea that the technology is moving toward 
constant returns to scale, and equal to unity shows no changes in the shape of the 
technology. 
ScaleTech
1t
ScaleTech
ScaleTech
A similar decomposition of the Malmquist index is also proposed by Ray and Desli 
(1997). They combine changes in the scale of efficiency and changes in the scale of 
technology into a single term (SCH). However, Simar and Wilson (1999) state that Ray and 
Desli’s SCH confuses changes in the shape of the technology and changes in scale efficiency 
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experienced by the production unit. Färe (1997), agrees that Ray and Desli’s alternative 
decomposition of Malmquist incorrectly measures changes in scale efficiency. Other kinds of 
decompositions and components of the Malmquist index are described by Fried et al. (2008), 
who conclude that the choice of appropriate decompositions is dependent on the research 
question. Accordingly, in this study, the comprehensive decomposition of Simar and Wilson 
(1998a) is employed with the aim of providing additional insight into productivity and 
technical change in the banking industry in Iran. 
 
4. Formulation of the Bootstrap 
Simar (1992) and Simar and Wilson (1998b) are pioneers in using the bootstrap in frontier 
models to obtain non-parametric envelopment estimators. The idea behind bootstrapping is to 
approximate a true sampling distribution by mimicking the data-generating process. The 
procedure is based on constructing a pseudo sample and re-solving the DEA model for each 
DMU with the new data. Repeating this process many times enables us to build a good 
approximation of the true distribution. Simar and Wilson (1998b) show that the statistically 
consistent estimation of such confidence intervals very much depends on the consistent 
replication of a data-generating process (DGP). In other words, the most important problem 
of bootstrapping in frontier models relates to the consistent mimicking of the DGP.3 They 
argued that this problem refers to the bounded nature of the distance functions. Since the 
distance estimation values are close to unity, re-sampling directly from the set of original data 
(the so-called naive bootstrap) to construct pseudo-samples will provide an inconsistent 
bootstrap estimation of the confidence intervals. 
Hence, to overcome this problem, they propose a smoothed bootstrap procedure. They 
use a univariate kernel estimator of density of the original distance function estimates (for 
efficiency scores in that case), and then construct the pseudo data from this estimated density. 
However, to estimate the Malmquist indices, we have panel data instead of a single cross-
section of data with the possibility of temporal correlation. Thus, Simar and Wilson (1999), 
in adapting the bootstrapping procedure for Malmquist indices, propose a consistent method 
using a bivariate kernel density estimate via the covariance matrix of data from adjacent 
years. However, the estimated distance functions 
1 1it t
D and 
2 2
it t
D  using a kernel estimator are 
bounded from above unity and it is noted by Simar and Wilson (1999) that a bivariate kernel 
                                                            
3 See Simar and Wilson (2000) for a thorough analysis based on Monte Carlo evidence. 
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estimator value under this condition is biased and asymptotically inconsistent. To account for 
this issue, Simar and Wilson (1998b, 1999) adapt a univariate reflection method proposed by 
Silverman (1986).4 Therefore, to achieve consistent replication of the DGP taking all of these 
features into account, one must  use the smoothed bootstrap.  Repeatedly re-sampling from 
the Malmquist indices via the smoothed bootstrap results in a mimic of the sampling 
distribution of the original distance functions (a set of bootstrap Malmquist indices), from 
which confidence intervals can be constructed. On the whole, this process can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Calculation of the Malmquist index 1 2( , )
o
iM t t for each bank ( 1,..., )i N=  in each time (
and ) by solving the linear programming models (8) and (9) and their reversals. 1t 2t
2. Construction of the pseudo data set ( ){ }* *, ; 1,..., ; 1,2it itx y i N t= = to create the reference 
bootstrap technology using the bivariate kernel density estimation and adaption of the 
reflection method proposed by Silverman (1986). 
3. Calculation of the bootstrap estimate of the Malmquist index * 1 2( , )
o
iM t t for each bank
 by applying the original estimators to the pseudo sample attained in step 
2. 
( 1,..., )i = N
4. Repeating steps 2 to 3 for a large number of B times (in this study B=2000) to 
facilitate B sets of estimates for each firm.  
5. Construct the confidence intervals for the Malmquist indices. 
 
The basic idea designed for construction of the confidence intervals of the Malmquist indices 
is that the distribution of 
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )
o o
i iM t t M t t−  is unknown and can be approximated by the 
distribution of * 1 2( , )oi 1 2( , )oiM t t − M t t oi, where 1 2( , )M t t is the true unknown index, 1 2( , )oiM t t  is the 
estimate of the Malmquist index, and *
1 2( ,
o
i )M t t is the bootstrap estimate of the index. Hence, 
aα and bα defining the (1 )α−  confidence interval:  
1 2 1 2Pr( ( , ) ( , ) ) 1
o o
i ib M t t M t t aα α α≤ − ≤ = −                 (14) 
can be approximated by estimating the values *aα and 
*bα given by: 
* * *
1 2 1 2Pr( ( , ) ( , ) ) 1
o o
i ib M t t M t t aα α α≤ − ≤ = −
                                                           
                (15) 
 
4 This method is founded on the idea of “reflecting” the probability mass lying beyond unity where, in theory, 
no probability mass should exist. 
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Thus, an estimated (1 )α− percentage confidence interval for the i-th Malmquist index is 
given by: 
* *
1 2 1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )
o o o
i i iM t t a M t t M t t bα α+ ≤ ≤ +               (16) 
A Malmquist index for the i-th firm is said to be significantly different from unity (which 
would indicate no productivity change), at the α % level, if the interval in Eq. (16) does not 
include unity. 
It should be mentioned that using the calculated bootstrap value in step 4, we can also 
correct for any finite-sample bias in the original estimators of the Malmquist indices.  We 
only need to apply a simple procedure outlined by Simar & Wilson (1999) as follows: 
 
The bootstrap bias estimate for the original estimator 1 2( , )oiM t t is: 
1 *
1 2 1 2 1 2
1
( , ) ( , )( ) ( , )
B
o o
B i i i
b
bias M t t B M t t b M t t−
=
⎡ ⎤ = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ∑
o
             (17) 
Thus, a bias-corrected estimate of 1 2( , )
o
iM t t can be computed as: 
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 *
1 2 1 2
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
               2 ( , ) ( , )( ).
o o o
Bi i i
B
o o
i i
b
M t t M t t bias M t t
M t t B M t t b−
=
⎡ ⎤= − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
= − ∑
              (18) 
However, as explained by Simar & Wilson (1999), this bias-corrected estimator may have a 
higher mean-square error than the original estimator, and hence it will be less reliable. 
Overall, the bias-corrected estimator should only be considered if the sample variance * 2is  of 
the bootstrap values { }* 1 2
1,...,
( , )( )oi
b B
M t t b
=
is less than a third of the squared bootstrap bias estimate 
for the original estimator, that is; 
( )2* 2 1 21 ( , )3 oi B ibias M t ts ⎡ ⎤< ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .                (19) 
This procedure can be achieved using commands malmquist.components and malmquist in 
the FEAR software program. 
The above methodology for Malmquist indices can be easily adapted to the efficiency 
scores. Only the time-dependence structure of the data which is taken into account for the 
Malmquist indices must be changed by replacing and with the period considered. The 
procedure can be done using command boot.sw98 using FEAR. 
1t 2t
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5. The Data 
To facilitate measurement of efficiency scores and productivity change, we initially had to 
specify sets of inputs and outputs for the banks in our sample. However, there is no consensus 
as to how to specify inputs and outputs. In this study, focusing on bank services, we employ 
the intermediation approach. Under this approach banks are viewed as financial 
intermediaries with outputs measured in dollar amounts, and with labour, capital, and various 
funding sources as inputs. This approach has several variants; asset, value-added and user 
cost views. Sealy and Lindley (1977) focus on the role of banks as financial intermediaries 
between depositors and final users of bank assets, and classify deposits and other liabilities, 
together with real resources (labour and capital), as inputs, and only bank assets such as loans 
as outputs. Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) classify loans and all types of deposits as 
"important" outputs since these balance sheet categories contribute to bank value added, and 
labour, capital, and purchased funds they classify as inputs. Alternatively, Aly et al. (1990) 
and Hancock (1991) implement a user-cost framework to determine whether a financial 
product is an input or an output owing to its net contribution to bank revenue. Utilising this 
approach a bank asset can be categorized as an output if the financial return on the asset 
exceeds the opportunity cost of the investment, and a liability can be categorized as an output 
if the financial cost of the liability is less than its opportunity cost. 
As our measurement of productivity depends on a mutually exclusive distinction 
between inputs and outputs, following Aly et al. (1990), as well as Wheelock and Wilson 
(1999) and Burgess and Wilson (1995), we classify inputs and outputs on the basis of the user 
cost approach. We include three inputs: labour 1( )x  measured by the number of full-time 
equivalent employees on the payroll at the end of each period, physical capital 2( )x measured 
by the book value of premises and fixed assets, and purchased funds 3( )x  including all time 
and savings deposits and other borrowed funds (not including demand deposits). We include 
three outputs: total demand deposits , public sector loans including loans for 
agriculture, manufacturing, mining and services, and non-public loans . All data were 
obtained from Iran’s Central Bank archives (CBI 2005, and CBI 2008). We consider all 
banks operating in the Iranian banking industry except three banks that are not homogenous 
in input and output mixes. We have balanced panel data for 14 banks and 6 years (2003-
2008). 
1( )y 2 )
3( y
( y
)
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6. Empirical Results 
6.1 Estimated Output-Oriented Technical Efficiency Scores 
To estimate output-oriented technical efficiency for the banks, the linear programming 
problems in equation (9) must be solved for each bank in each period, and the interpretation 
is simple. When ov
it tD is equal to unity it indicates that the i-th firm lies on the boundary of the 
production set of period t, and accordingly is technically efficient. When ovit tD is below unity it 
indicates that the firm is positioned under the frontier and is technically inefficient. Table 1 
summarizes annual mean efficiency for the banking industry over the period 2003-2008. 
Column 2 of Table 1 lists the mean efficiency estimates, and columns 3-6 list the bias-
corrected estimates, bootstrap bias estimates, and the efficiency’s lower and upper bounds for 
the 95% confidence intervals (annual means), respectively, for each year. Table 1 shows that 
although the industry is inefficient over all years, the industry efficiency level improves over 
the period 2003-2006, and declines considerably after 2006. Note that in all cases the mean of 
estimated efficiency lies to the right of the estimated confidence intervals; this result 
obviously reflects the theory behind the construction of the confidence intervals presented by 
Simar and Wilson (1998b). 
Table 1, Bootstrap estimates (Annual average) 
Year Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected Bias Lower Bound Upper Bound
2003 0.8940 0.8258 0.0681 0.4890 0.8908
2004 0.9542 0.9284 0.0258 0.8305 0.9542
2005 0.9793 0.9685 0.0107 0.9309 0.9793
2006 0.9911 0.9877 0.0033 0.9777 0.9911
2007 0.8928 0.8826 0.0103 0.8623 0.8926
2008 0.9382 0.9028 0.0354 0.6285 0.9378
Mean 0.9416 0.9160 0.0256 0.7865 0.9409
Source: Authors' calculations.  
In addition, the estimates of technical efficiency differ from the bias-corrected 
estimates. In some periods this difference (the bias) is quite small. For instance, the 
difference was less than 0.03 between 2004 and 2007, while in 2003 the difference was about 
0.07. The means of the estimated confidence intervals, which define statistical location of the 
true efficiency, were pretty narrow over 2005, 2006 and 2007. The minor bias of VRS 
estimates and the relatively smaller confidence intervals in these years imply that the results 
are relatively stable. However, results from this Table are very general and do not help us to 
distinguish between the performance of individual banks. Hence, the bootstraps of the 
efficiency scores for individual banks are displayed in three major categories of commercial, 
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specialized and private banks in Tables 2 and 3. For the sake of brevity, only the bootstrap of 
efficiency scores for the years 2003 and 2008 are presented in these tables, respectively5.  
A comparison of Table 2 and Table 3 shows that the specialized banks are the most 
efficient banks in both years. The results are mixed for commercial and private banks. A 
number of banks show similar efficiencies in both periods, but a few banks show substantial 
disparities over the periods. For instance, among the commercial banks, National Bank and 
Trade Bank were efficient in both periods, whereas Bank Refah, which is quite inefficient in 
2003, becomes efficient in 2008. On the other hand, the situation of Export Bank becomes 
worse in 2008, and its efficiency deteriorates from 0.95 in 2003 to 0.74 in 2008. Private 
banks also show similar disparities; Parsian Bank and EN Bank appear to be pretty efficient 
in both periods. Karafarin Bank improves its efficiency significantly in 2008 and reaches an 
efficiency score of 1.0, but Saman Bank’s position perform exactly the opposite. 
Table 2
Bootstrap of efficiency scores, 2003
Bank Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected Bias Lower Bound Upper Bound
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.0000 0.9155 0.0845 0.5082 0.9962
Bank Sepah 0.8995 0.8440 0.0555 0.7062 0.8965
Export Bank 0.9538 0.8972 0.0566 0.7382 0.9506
Trade Bank 0.8188 0.7727 0.0461 0.6212 0.8160
Bank Mellat 1.0000 0.9087 0.0913 0.5457 0.9954
Bank Refah 0.6665 0.6266 0.0399 0.5084 0.6639
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 1.0000 0.9181 0.0819 0.5197 0.9962
Housing Bank 1.0000 0.9164 0.0836 0.0013 0.9971
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.0000 0.9102 0.0898 0.5745 0.9954
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.0000 0.9221 0.0779 0.4090 0.9970
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 0.5122 0.4816 0.0307 0.3996 0.5108
Saman Bank 0.6651 0.6234 0.0417 0.4967 0.6629
Parsian Bank 1.0000 0.9116 0.0884 0.4200 0.9962
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.0000 0.9139 0.0861 0.3983 0.9970
Mean 0.8940 0.8258 0.0681 0.4891 0.8908
Source: Authors' calculations.  
As stated by Simar and Wilson (1998b), relative comparisons of the performance 
among firms based on the estimated efficiency scores should be made with caution. Of 
special note, Housing Bank is efficient in both periods (as its estimated efficiency is 1.000 in 
both periods), and its estimated confidence intervals for 2003 and 2008 overlap. However the 
estimated lower bound in 2008 was much higher than that of 2003, suggesting that its true 
                                                            
5 Results for all years are available from the authors upon request. 
14 
 
efficiency may have improved in 2008. In this case the bias-corrected efficiency scores can 
be very helpful in distinguishing between decision units. For instance, the bias-corrected 
efficiency of Housing Bank increases from 0.916 in 2003 to 0.958 in 2008, suggesting that 
this bank was not equally efficient in 2003 and 2008. The bias for some banks is very small; 
hence, their bias-corrected efficiency score is very close to the original estimate (e.g. Saman 
Bank in 2008), but a few banks show large differences (e.g. Bank Mellat in 2003). The bias 
estimates, in general, are higher for the most efficient banks (with the estimated efficiency of 
1.000) in both years. There are also substantial dissimilarities between banks’ confidence 
intervals; both Tables 2 and 3 show that a number of estimated confidence intervals are quite 
wide (e.g. Housing Bank and EN Bank in Table 2 and BIM and Parsian in Table 3), while 
others are rather narrow (e.g. Bank Refah and Karafarin Bank in Table 2 and Bank Refah and 
Saman Bank in Table 3). In general, the widths of confidence intervals appear to be narrower 
and the bias-corrected efficiencies tend to reach higher values in 2008.  
Table 3
Bootstrap of efficiency scores, 2008
Bank Estimated Eff Bias-Corrected Bias Lower Bound Upper Bound
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.0000 0.9603 0.0397 0.5574 0.9997
Bank Sepah 0.9097 0.8796 0.0301 0.7794 0.9093
Export Bank 0.7382 0.7153 0.0229 0.6177 0.7380
Trade Bank 0.9617 0.9341 0.0275 0.8150 0.9613
Bank Mellat 1.0000 0.9583 0.0418 0.6862 0.9995
Bank Refah 1.0000 0.9589 0.0411 0.5616 0.9995
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 1.0000 0.9574 0.0426 0.8045 0.9994
Housing Bank 1.0000 0.9584 0.0416 0.7654 0.9994
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.0000 0.9794 0.0206 0.5642 0.9991
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.0000 0.9592 0.0408 0.4282 0.9996
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 1.0000 0.9571 0.0429 0.5071 0.9910
Saman Bank 0.5252 0.5085 0.0167 0.4349 0.5250
Parsian Bank 1.0000 0.9554 0.0446 0.4749 0.9993
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.0000 0.9576 0.0424 0.8026 0.9990
Mean 0.9382 0.9028 0.0354 0.6285 0.9371
Source: Authors' calculations.
 
 
6.2 The Decomposition of the Malmquist Index  
Concentrating only on efficiency estimates can provide an incomplete view of the 
performance of banks over time. It is for this reason that changes in distance function values 
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over time could be caused by either 1) movement of banks within the input-output space 
(efficiency changes), or 2) progress/regress of the boundary of the production set over time 
(technological changes). The decomposition of the Malmquist index, as explained in section 
2, makes it possible to distinguish changes in productivity, efficiency and technological 
change. 
Table 4 reports various estimates of productivity changes for banks in the three 
categories over five pairs of years between 2003 and 2008. Almost all of the estimates are 
significantly different from unity at the 90% or 95% level of significance. Only BIM is 
insignificantly different from unity for one pair of years (2007/2008). Over 2003-2004 - the 
period after the private banks came into existence – of all 14 estimates of productivity 
changes only 5 banks show productivity gains. In this period, two of the specialized banks, 
Agricultural Bank and Housing Bank, had the highest levels of productivity losses. On 
average, the industry showed an 11% productivity loss (i.e. 0.98 productivity changes). The 
results for the three pairs of years, however, were quite the opposite. 
During the period 2004-2005 all of the banks (with two exceptions) show moderate 
gains and all specialized banks show productivity expansions. In the period 2005-2006 the 
results indicate significant gains for ten banks, and significant decreases in productivity for 
four banks (two specialized banks and two private banks). All commercial banks show rather 
large productivity gains over this period. During the period 2006-2007 the industry showed a 
significant increase in productivity; about 28% on average. All banks but one showed 
productivity gains, and among these banks two of the specialized banks (i.e. ED Bank and 
BIM), demonstrated massive productivity advances of 2.29 and 2.67, respectively. The 
results for 2007-2008, however, were largely different. Most of the banks experienced large 
productivity losses and none of the commercial banks were productive. BIM, which showed 
the highest level of productivity gain in 2006-2007, exhibited a 33% productivity loss in 
2007-2008. This pattern was also true for some of the commercial and private banks (Export 
Bank, Trade Bank, Bank Mellat and EN Bank). Using the four components explained in 
section 2, we can now trace the main causes of the productivity changes over the sample 
period. Tables 5-6 present estimates of the changes in pure efficiency, scale efficiency, pure 
technology and scale of technology, respectively.  
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Table 4
Estimates of Malmquist indexes (changes in productivity)
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 0.8208* 1.0740* 1.1795* 1.1426* 0.9083*
Bank Sepah 0.6920** 1.0804* 1.3003* 1.0548* 0.7610*
Export Bank 1.1310* 0.7633* 1.0915* 1.2199* 0.7202*
Trade Bank 0.8487* 1.0972* 1.0695* 1.2057* 0.8988*
Bank Mellat 0.6510* 1.1616* 1.2716* 1.2565* 0.9020*
Bank Refah 1.0179* 1.0818* 1.2881* 1.0993* 0.7688*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.5847* 1.1201* 1.1231* 1.0357* 0.9371*
Housing Bank 0.4532* 1.2940* 1.3102* 1.1968* 1.1560*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 0.8865* 1.0110* 0.6927* 2.2992* 1.2269*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.3221* 1.0966* 0.8645* 2.6721* 0.6755
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 1.2538* 1.0707* 1.1854* 1.0004* 0.8405**
Saman Bank 1.1387* 1.1847* 1.4870* 0.5171* 0.8969*
Parsian Bank 0.8804* 0.9007* 0.9943* 1.0232* 1.0139*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 0.8332* 1.1086* 0.8291* 1.2109* 0.9565*
Mean 0.8939 1.0746 1.1067 1.2810 0.9045
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicate declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant 
differences from unity at 95%.
Source: Authors' calculations.
 
Table 5
Estimates of change in pure efficiency
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Sepah 0.9910* 0.9994* 1.0000 1.00* 0.9046*
Export Bank 1.0477* 1.00* 0.9568* 1.0140* 0.7610*
Trade Bank 1.2196* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 0.9615*
Bank Mellat 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Refah 1.4970* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 0.9883* 1.0118*
Housing Bank 0.7051* 1.1618* 1.1770* 0.9850* 1.0528*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 1.5435* 1.3415* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00**
Saman Bank 1.4351* 1.00* 1.00* 0.5883* 0.8879*
Parsian Bank 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.00* 1.00* 0.9588* 1.0429* 1.00*
Mean 1.1028 1.0359 1.0066 0.9728 0.9677
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicate declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant 
differences from unity at 95%. 
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Table 6
Estimates of change in scale efficiency
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 1.0940* 1.00* 0.9916* 0.5217* 1.7376*
Bank Sepah 0.9437* 0.9856* 0.9111* 0.7321* 1.0454*
Export Bank 1.2852* 0.9868* 0.8594* 0.4986* 1.8684*
Trade Bank 0.9586* 1.0120* 0.9962* 0.6048* 1.6495*
Bank Mellat 0.9552* 1.0401* 1.0065* 0.6837* 1.4624*
Bank Refah 1.0029* 1.00** 1.0000 1.00*** 1.00***
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.8808* 0.9940* 1.0521* 0.5659* 1.2925*
Housing Bank 0.7966* 0.9547* 0.9785* 0.9392* 0.9916*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) 1.00* 0.9041* 0.7461* 1.1078* 1.3207*
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank 0.9078* 0.8151* 1.1262* 0.9555* 0.8010*
Saman Bank 0.8895* 1.1712* 1.00* 0.9458* 0.9559*
Parsian Bank 1.00*** 1.0000 1.0000 1.00* 1.00*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) 1.00* 1.00* 0.9849* 1.0152* 0.9373*
Mean 0.9796 0.9903 0.9752 0.8265 1.2187
Note: Numbers greater than unity indicate improvements and less than unity indicate declines.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; triple asterisk (***) denote significant  
differences from unity at 99%. 
Source: Authors' calculations.
 
Estimated changes in pure efficiency have been reported in Table 5. In sum, for 
consecutive years, out of the 70 estimates of changes in pure efficiency, only 24 estimates 
were different from unity while all of them were statistically significant. A number of banks 
showed no changes in pure efficiency for all reported years (e.g. National Bank, Bank Mellat, 
Agricultural Bank, ED Bank, BIM, and Parsian Bank). During 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 
(i.e. in the post regulation era) when interest rates and the allocation of direct lending 
facilities were regulated, the number of banks with losses in pure efficiency increased to four 
and five banks, respectively. Hence, the industry, on average, showed negative changes in 
technical efficiency as a result of inappropriate policies. 
Table 6 reveals the estimated changes in scale efficiency where all changes from unity 
are statistically significant. Results for BIM are not significant in any of the reported periods. 
The results for 2003-2004, 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 are mixed. Over these three periods 
most of the banks experienced negative changes in scale efficiency (i.e. the estimates are less 
than unity) or very low levels of positive changes. Over the period 2006-2007, the results 
deteriorated and only two banks show some improvements in scale efficiency (i.e. ED Bank 
and EN Bank). Other banks either experienced negative changes or their scale efficiency 
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remains more or less unchanged (e.g. Bank Refah, BIM and Parsian Bank). Hence, these 
results, in conjunction with those for changes in pure efficiency, indicate that the 
considerable changes in bank productivity for 2006-2007 cannot be attributable to efficiency 
change components (pure efficiency change or scale efficiency change); they can be 
explained only by technological changes. The results for 2007-2008 were enhanced as nearly 
all of the government-owned banks showed considerable positive changes in scale efficiency. 
However, the situation for private banks deteriorated as demonstrated by larger declines. As 
can be seen by the last row of Table 6, only the final period shows positive changes in scale 
efficiency, suggesting that scale inefficiency was a major source of inefficiency among the 
Iranian banks.  
Tables 7 and 8 show the estimated changes in pure technology in production 
possibilities and scale of technology, respectively. The estimated changes are significantly 
different from unity in all cases at different significance levels. In a number of cases these 
changes for specialized banks and private banks could not be computed due to the constraints 
imposed in the linear programming to estimate cross-period distance functions. We have 
indicated these cases by INF in Tables 7 and 8, indicating that they were infeasible to 
compute. 6 The results from Table 7 reveal that in 2003-2004 technology among the 
government-owned banks shifted inwards for all but Export Bank. However, in 2004-2005, 
2005-2006, and 2006-2007, the estimated changes in pure technology were greater than unity 
for nearly all firms with the only exception being Export Bank in 2004-2005, suggesting an 
overall technological progress in the industry. This is most probably due to the technological 
advances in the banking industry which commenced in 2004 such as increased numbers of 
automated teller machines (ATM), credit cards, debit cards and online-branches. Almost all 
banks also showed large decreases in technology for the period 2007-2008. For the private 
banks all these changes, except for EN Bank in the last period, were significantly greater than 
unity in the sample period.  
 
 
                                                            
6 This difficulty is also experienced by Gilbert and Wilson (1998). 
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Table 7
Estimates of change in pure technology
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 0.9636* 1.1555* 1.1698* 1.1883* 0.9340*
Bank Sepah 0.8489* 1.0850* 1.1528* 1.1672** 0.9145*
Export Bank 1.0988* 0.7439* 1.2648* 1.2298*** 0.9431*
Trade Bank 0.8309* 1.1080* 1.0750* 1.0640* 0.8204*
Bank Mellat 0.9138* 1.0802* 1.1977* 1.1675* 0.9043*
Bank Refah 0.6698* 1.0794* 1.2865* 1.1072*** 0.7392*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.7891* 1.0766* 1.0232* 1.0932** 0.9049*
Housing Bank 0.9454* 1.2338* 1.1366* 1.2158** 1.1001*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) INF INF INF 1.3235*** INF
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) INF INF INF INF INF
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank INF INF INF INF INF
Saman Bank INF 1.1151*** 1.6001*** INF 1.0815*
Parsian Bank INF 1.1631* 1.0889* 1.1016* 1.0615*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) INF INF INF 1.1260** 0.9374*
Mean 0.8825 1.0841 1.1996 1.1622 0.9401
Note: Estimates greater than unity indicate an increase in pure technology and 
estimates less than unity indicate a decrease in pure technology. INF=Infeasible to compute. 
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%; double asterisk (**) denote significant 
differences from unity at 95%; triple asterisk (***) denote significant differences from unity at 99%. 
Source: Authors' calculations.
Table 8
Estimates of change in scale of technology
Bank 2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
 - Government-owned Banks:
          Commercial Banks:
National Bank 0.7785* 0.9294* 1.0168* 1.8428* 0.5596*
Bank Sepah 0.8715* 1.0108* 1.1041* 1.2343* 0.8799*
Export Bank 0.7642* 1.0396* 1.0493* 1.9619* 0.5370*
Trade Bank 0.8736* 0.9784* 0.9985* 1.8736* 0.6908*
Bank Mellat 0.7458* 1.0338* 1.0548* 1.5739* 0.6820*
Bank Refah 1.0121* 1.0022* 1.0012* 0.9928* 1.0400*
         Specialized Banks:
Agricultural Bank 0.8412* 1.0466* 1.0432* 1.6936* 0.7918*
Housing Bank 0.8534* 0.9454* 1.0008* 1.0640* 1.0064*
Export development Bank (ED Bank) INF      INF      INF      1.5681* INF      
Bank of Industry and Mines (BIM) INF      INF      INF      INF      INF      
 - Private Banks:
Karafarin Bank INF      INF      INF      INF      INF      
Saman Bank INF      INF      0.9070* 0.9288* 0.9769*
Parsian Bank INF      0.7744* 0.9130* 0.9288* 0.9551*
Bank Eghtesad Novin (EN Bank) INF      INF      INF      INF      1.0885*
Mean 0.8425 0.9668 1.0111 1.4734 0.8371
Note: Estimates greater than unity show that the technology is moving farther from constant return to scale,
and estimates less than unity indicate that the technology is moving toward constant returns to scale.  
INF=Infeasible to compute.
Single asterisk (*) denote significant differences from unity at 90%. 
Source: Authors' calculations.
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Finally, as to the shape of technology, the estimated changes in the scale of 
technology are presented in Table 8. The estimated changes in the private banks are 
significantly less than unity in almost every case, indicating that the technological region of 
these banks in the input-output space was moving toward constant returns to scale between 
2004 and 2008. Among the government-owned banks the results are the opposite in three 
periods; 2004-2005, 2005-2006, and 2006-2007, meaning that returns to scale of technology 
were becoming increasingly convex and more variable. Given that the private banks are much 
smaller than the government-owned banks, these results seem to imply that the most efficient 
scale size is falling over these periods. However, the technology faced by government-owned 
banks in the last period moved toward constant returns to scale; since the estimated changes 
showed values less than unity for most of them. In brief, the results in Tables 6 and 8 
emphasize that the portion of the technology confronting government-owned banks seems to 
have moved substantially further from constant returns to scale, and the banks have 
performed under decreasing returns to scale for a long period.  
In general, the results in Tables 4 to 8 indicate that while government ownership resulted 
in large advances in the technology of commercial and specialized banks over time, it also 
caused scale inefficiencies and kept the most efficient scale size smaller than it otherwise 
would have prevailed. Government-owned banks show no positive changes in pure technical 
efficiency during the sample period. Also, after the regulation, three of the largest 
commercial banks have become considerably inefficient. This may be attributed to the 
significant growth of NPLs since 2006. However, the technology advances of government-
owned banks offset the increase in scale and pure technical inefficiencies over 2004-2005, 
2005-2006, and 2006-2007, and hence, productivity increases in almost all government-
owned banks. But, over the period 2007-2008 large increases in the scale efficiency of these 
banks do not offset the rise in pure technical inefficiency and the reduction in pure 
technology (in production possibilities). Hence, on average, their productivity deteriorates 
considerably through time.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has employed bootstrapped Malmquist indices and efficiency scores developed by 
Simar and Wilson (1998b, 1999) to investigate the effects of Iranian government regulation 
launched in 2005 on the technical efficiency and productivity changes of the banking industry 
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over the period 2003-2008. We also applied an alternative decomposition of the Malmquist 
index, introduced by Simar and Wilson (1998a), to provide a more comprehensive analysis of 
productivity and technical changes in the banking industry. Hence, four different components 
of productivity changes were estimated; i.e. changes in pure technical efficiency, changes in 
scale efficiency, pure changes in technology and changes in scale of technology. The 
bootstrap approach emphasises that the majority of our estimates are statistically significant. 
Based on our results, it appears that the industry efficiency level (output-oriented 
technical efficiency) has improved over the period 2003-2006, and deteriorated considerably 
soon after the regulatory changes were introduced. Also, our findings show that the highly 
efficient banks are among either private or government-owned banks but not the specialised 
banks. Productivity changes show the same fluctuations as technical efficiency and the extent 
of productivity changes declines significantly after 2006. In general, it can be concluded that 
although the regulatory changes had different effects on different banks, the efficiency and 
productivity of the industry has declined after introducing the regulation. There is a 
significant room for improvement in government-owned banks in terms of technical and scale 
efficiency.  It seems that government control of these banks tends to limit incentives and the 
ability of managers to operate efficiently. As a result, government-owned banks move farther 
from constant returns to scale, and the banks perform under decreasing returns to scale for a 
long period.  
It can therefore be suggested that the privatization of banking industry should be 
expedited and the government should reduce its political interference to boost the efficiency 
and productivity of banks in Iran. We found that the productivity of private banks has fallen 
considerably after regulations have been imposed since 2005-2006. One may argue that the 
lacklustre performance of banks was mainly due to a considerable rise in deposits and scale 
inefficiency attributable to the lack of institutional growth. 
 
  
22 
 
References 
Aly, H.Y., Grabowski, R., Pasurka, C. & Rangan, N. (1990), Technical, Scale, and Allocative 
Efficiencies in U.S. Banking: An Empirical Investigation, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol.72, pp. 211-218. 
Balcombe, K., Davidova, S. & Latruffe, L. (2008), The use of bootstrapped Malmquist 
indices to reassess productivity change findings: an application to a sample of Polish 
farms, Applied Economics, Vol.40, No.16, pp. 2055-2061. 
Berger, A.N., Hanweck, G.A. & Humphrey, D.B. (1987), Competitive Viability in Banking: 
Scale, Scope, and Product Mixeconomies, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol.20, 
pp. 501-520. 
Burgess, J.F. & Wilson, P.W. (1995), Decomposing Hospital Productivity Changes, 1985-
1988: A Nonparametric Malmquist Approach, The Journal of Productivity Analysis, 
Vol.6, pp. 343-363. 
Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R. & Diewert, W.E. (1982), The Economic Theory of Index 
Numbers and the Measurement of Input, Output, and Productivity, Econometrica, 
Vol.50 No.6, pp. 1393-1414. 
CBI, 2005, Iranian Banks Performance Report 2005, Central Bank of Iran, Tehran. 
CBI, 2006, Annual Report 2006, Central Bank of Iran, Teharn. 
CBI, 2008, Iranian Banks Performance Report 2008, Central Bank of Iran, Tehran. 
Coelli, T.J., Rao, D.S.P., O’Donnell, C.J. & Battese, G.E. (2005), An Introduction to 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, Springer Science and Business Media, New 
York. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Lindgren, B. & Roos, P. (1992), Productivity Changes in Swedish 
Pharmacies 1980-1989: A Nonparametric Malmquist Approach, Journal of 
Productivity Analysis, Vol.3, No.3, pp. 85-101. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Lindgren, B. & Roos, P. (1994a), Productivity Developments in 
Swedish Hospitals: A Malmquist Output Index Approach. In Charnes, A., Cooper, W. 
W., Y., L. A. & M., S. L. (Eds.) Data Envelopment Analysis: Theory, Methodology 
and Applications, Boston: Kluwer. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S. & Norris, M. (1997), Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and 
Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries: Reply, American Economic Review, 
Vol.87, No.6, pp. 1040-1043. 
Färe, R., Grosskopf, S., Norris, M. & Zhang, Z. (1994b), Productivity Growth, Technical 
Progress, and Efficiency Change in Industrialized Countries, The American Economic 
Review, Vol.84, No.1, pp. 66-83. 
Farrell, M.J. (1957), The Measurement of Productive Efficiency, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society Vol.Series A (general) l20, No.3, pp. 229-253. 
23 
 
Fethi, M.D. & Pasiouras, F. (2010), Assessing Bank Performance with Operational Research 
and Artificial Intelligence Techniques: A Survey, European Journal of Operational 
Research, Vol.204, pp. 189-198. 
Fried, H.O., Lovell, C.A.K. & Schmidt, S.S. (Eds.) (2008), The Measurement of Productive 
Efficiency and Productivity Growth, NewYork, Oxford University Press. 
Galdeano-Gómez, E. (2008), Productivity effects of environmental performance: evidence 
from TFP analysis on marketing cooperatives, Applied Economics, Vol.40, No.14, 
pp. 1873-1888. 
Gilbert, R.A. & Wilson, P.W. (1998), Effect of Deregulation in the Productivity of Korean 
Banks, Journal of Economics and Business, Vol.50 No.2, pp. 133-155. 
Hancock, D. (1991), A Theory of Production for the Financial Firm, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, Boston. 
Hoff, A. (2006), Bootstrapping Malmquist Indices for Danish Seiners in the North Sea and 
Skagerrak, Journal of Applied Statistics, Vol.33, No.9, pp. 891-907. 
Kneip, A., Park, B. & Simar, L. (1996) Note on the Convergence of Nonparametric DEA 
Efficiency Measures. CORE Discussion Papers 1996039, Université catholique de 
Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). 
Latruffe, L., Davidova, S. & Balcombe, K. (2008), Productivity change in Polish agriculture: 
an illustration of a bootstrapping procedure applied to Malmquist indices, Post-
Communist Economies, Vol.20, No.4, pp. 449-460. 
Lovell, C.A.K. (2000), Editor’s introduction, Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol.13, pp. 5-
6. 
Ray, S.C. & Desli, E. (1997), Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and Efficiency 
Change in Industrialized Countries: Comment, The American Economic Review, 
Vol.87, No.50, pp. 1033-1039. 
Sealy, C.W. & Lindley, J. (1977), Inputs, outputs and a theory of production and cost at 
depository financial institutions, Journal of Finance, Vol.32, pp. 1252-1266. 
Shephard, R.W. (1970), Theory of Cost and Production Functions, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Silverman, B.W. (1986), Density Estimation for Statistics and Data Analysis, Chapman and 
Hall, London. 
Simar, L. (1992), Estimating efficiencies from frontier models with panel data: A comparison 
of parametric non-parametric and semi-parametric methods with bootstrapping, 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol.3, pp. 167-203. 
Simar, L. & Wilson, P.W. (1998a) Productivity Growth in Industrialized Countries. CORE 
Discussion Papers 1998036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations 
Research and Econometrics (CORE). 
24 
 
25 
 
Simar, L. & Wilson, P.W. (1998b), Sensitivity analysis of efficiency scores: How to 
bootstrap in nonparametric frontier models, Management Science, Vol.44, No.1, pp. 
49–61. 
Simar, L. & Wilson, P.W. (1999), Estimating and bootstrapping Malmquist indices, European 
Journal of Operational Research, Vol.115, pp. 459-471. 
Simar, L. & Wilson, P.W. (2000), Statistical inference in nonparametric frontier models: The 
state of the art, Journal of Productivity Analysis, Vol.13, No.1, pp. 49-78. 
Tortosa-Ausina, E., Grifell-Tatje, E., Armero, C. & Conesa, D. (2008), Sensitivity analysis of 
efficiency and Malmquist productivity indices: An application to Spanish savings 
banks, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol.184, pp. 1062–1084. 
Wheelock, D.C. & Wilson, P.W. (1999), Technical Progress, Inefficiency and Productivity 
Change in U.S Banking 1984-1993, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.31, 
No.2, pp. 212-234. 
Wilson, P.W. (2006) FEAR 1.0 User’s Guide. Department of Economics, Clemson 
University, Clemson, USA. 
